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Abstract. The paper discusses the government policy that encourages the emergence of co-operatives 
and analyzes the co-operatives in light of their growth in number. It establishes a static equilibrium and 
highlights the co-operatives’ adjustment process (dynamic equilibrium). 
The methodology/approach consists of the development of a theoretical model, using the Nash equili-
brium for the co-operative market, and the determination of a static equilibrium. It presents the data 
which includes variable measurements for the adjustment process for agricultural, artisanal, and fishery 
co-operatives in order to analyze the stochastic process of entry-and-exit flow of co-operatives. Accor-
dingly, the paper estimates the co-operatives’ growth index speed of adjustment (SOA) as a function 
of the mean-reversion Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) process. 
The theoretical results indicate that co-operatives’ earnings depend on the number of co-operatives, 
market-demand, and the capacity constraint. They also show that the margin for new entrants is a 
dynamic gap that especially depends on demand, capacity constraint and the profits. The empirical 
results indicate that co-operatives growth-index process is significantly mean reverting for all sectors, and 
the speed of adjustment for artisanal co-operatives is significantly higher than for those in agriculture 
and the fisheries. 
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1. Introduction
In recent times, co-operatives have been regarded as organizations that have the poten-
tial to promote socio-economic development, reduce poverty (Bibby & Shaw, 2005; 
Birchall, 2004; Münkner, 2012) and control the socio-economic destiny of local com-
munities (Nemon, 2000). The creation of co-operatives is an important force behind 
employment creation, economic growth and workers’ wellbeing (Czternasty, 2014; 
Verheul et al., 2002; ICA, 2013). Accordingly, in Morocco, cooperatives are consid-
ered the “future of Moroccan economy” (2015)1 under supervision of the Moroccan 
government through the Co-operative Development Office (ODCO)2. The authorities 
undertake the initiatives related to co-operatives creations towards structures devel-
oping social activities in the framework of the human development initiative (CESE, 
2015)3. The Moroccan government has adopted a new law (law N 112.12) that estab-
lishes a clear definition of a cooperative as an enterprise and simplifications of the legal 
procedures of creating co-operatives. Co-operatives have been able to grow in number 
achieving an amount of financial performance (see Figure 1 that shows the evolution of 
co-operatives from 1994 to 2015). By the end of 2015, there were 15,498 co-operatives 
for all sectors. Table 1.1 shows the financial performance (capital structure and the an-
nual turnover) by important sectors and regions. It reveals that there were 10,540 ag-
ricultural co-operatives, 2,497 artisanal co-operatives, and 153 fishery co-operatives. 
The agricultural co-operatives are with higher financial performance with 1,545,834.90 
dollar of annual capital and 9,268,143.95 dollar of annual turnover. This is followed 
by artisanal co-operatives with 121,875.15 of annual capital and 152,087.49 of annual 
turnover, and fishery co-operatives with 7,499.66 dollar of annual capital and 9,662.42 
related to turnover.
Table 1.2 shows additional statistics representing the classification by number and 
financial performance by regions. 
The government policy is promoting the emergence of co-operatives. However, af-
ter formation, nascent co-operatives face market conditions where it is important to 
generate revenue in order to survive (Alexander & Sara, 2014) and meet a minimum 
accepted standard of living (Conroy et al., 2006). Cooperatives are entering as a poten-
tial player in a market game that requires managerial skills, positioning strategies and 
negotiations with the dominant players (Couderc & Marchini, 2011). In connection 
to this, numerous authors consider co-operatives as entrepreneurs (Cook et al., 2004; 
Dana & Dana, 2008; Di Domenico et al., 2010, Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Perista & 
1 International co-operative alliance (2015). Morocco’s strategy for co-operative growth, direct link : https://www.
ica.coop/en/media/news/moroccos-strategy-co-operative-growth
2 Co-operative development office, direct link : http://www.odco.gov.ma/
3 Economic, Social and Environmental Council of Morocco. (20015). [http://www.ces.ma/Documents/
PDF/Auto-saisines/AS-19-2015-economie-sociale-et-solidaire/Rapport-AS19-2015-VF.pdf], n.d. URL 
http://www.ces.ma/Pages/Accueil.aspx (accessed 1.18.20).
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Nogueira, 2004; Zahra et al., 2009), others consider that cooperatives and businesses 
are established for similar reasons (Perotin, 2006). Thus, co-operatives as social enter-
prises are constrained to maintain their financial viability through market competition 
(Benos et al., 2018). However, this need for cooperatives for a competitive positioning 
seems to contradict their main social mission and their alternative social model of the 
capitalist model. For this, some authors consider that cooperatives do not spontane-
ously meet the conditions of the neoclassical economic framework (Mooney & Gray, 
2002, p. iv), others claim that the model framing the cooperatives is likely linked to the 
needs of members to maintain the balance of limited income-resource and to future 
income-needs (Ireland & Webb, 2009). 
The first step in co-operatives formation is determined by the free-entry to member-
ships that is based on the benefit that each individual can take (Sexton, 1986), but in 
subsequent time, this may turn to a free-ride in dealing with the context. This is because 
individuals in co-operatives are supposed to act on how they think the context and gov-
ernment institution functions and not on how it really operates (North, 1990). Accord-
ingly, some authors suggest that the behaviors of co-operatives are guided by emotions 
instead of economic rationality (Boone & Ozcan, 2016), and others consider that co-
operatives are in ambiguous relationship with the context (Russell & Hanneman, 1992). 
The free-ride behavior in co-operatives is related to the assumption of bounded ratio-
nality of members’ capability to comprehend complex issues (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 
2013) and the attachment to individual feelings instead of economic rational (Boone & 
Ozcan, 2016). Therefore, some authors suggest that members of co-operatives may not 
be aware of market barriers and market opportunities due to their lack of management 
skills and entrepreneurial capabilities (Figueiredo & Franco, 2018; Steinerowski, 2012; 
Zahra et al., 2009; Kirzner, 2008, p. 11; Conte & Jones, 1991; Pelling & High, 2005). 
In this sense, the model of Giannakas and Fulton (2005) analyzed a mixed duopoly of 
co-operatives and addressed the difficulty of members to capitalize long-term growth 
opportunities, which may lead to a situation that is not in equilibrium. 
TABLE 1.1. Co-operatives financial capital and turnover by sectors in 2015
Sectors Number ofco-operatives
Turnover Amount  
in Dollar
Capital Amount  
in Dollar
Agricultural 10,540 9,268,143.95 1,545,834.90
Artisanal 2,497 152,087.49 121,875.15
Fishery 153 9,662.42 7,499.66
TOTAL 13,190 9,559,249.32 1,675,209.73
Note: Financial capital and turnover for Moroccan cooperatives by sectors for 2015, (ODCO, 2016)
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Thus, the problem analyzed in this paper is related to the fact that co-operatives are 
considered to be hybrid enterprises based on their socio-economic duality that com-
bines social, participatory and commercial principles of entrepreneurs (Mooney et al., 
1996). The focus in this paper is on the sequence that is ulterior to the free-entry in 
memberships discussed by Sexton (1986). Our hypothesis here is based on the con-
cept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982; Dacin & Tracey, 2011) and the entrepre-
neurial capabilities constraints (del Val & Fuentes, 2003; Figueiredo & Franco, 2018) 
to analyze the stability in the number of co-operatives.  Numerous studies analysed the 
number of co-operatives (e.g., Perotin, 2006; Bresnahan & Reiss, 1991), but with differ-
ent approaches. Our approach is new and based on the Nash equilibrium and speed of 
adjustment. The paper does not focus on co-operatives governance and membership’s 
attitude and formation, for this you can see Sexton (1986), Boone and Ozcan (2016), 
Grashuis and Su (2019), and Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2012). First, we present the 
theoretical model, using the Nash equilibrium for the co-operative market and the de-
termination of a static equilibrium. Then, we present the data, which includes variable 
measurements for the adjustment process, and we analyze the adjustment stochastic 
process in the number of co-operatives. 
TABLE 1.2. Co-operatives financial capital and turnover by regions in 2015
Regions Number  of co-operatives 
Turnover Amount 
in Dollar
Capital Amount 
in Dollar
Souss-Massa 1,395 4,052,717.72 869,377.01
Casablanca-Settat 1,779 1,316,114.92 2,313,762.29
Béni Mellal-Khénifra 1,203 1,013,064.27 255,545.15
Marrakech-Safi 1,406 843,127.39 594,755.00
Tanger-Tetouan - Al Hoceima 1,485 778,982.48 394,339.45
l‘Oriental 1,215 530,118.57 525,896.66
Rabat -Salé -kénitra 1,665 443,948.60 911,140.44
Fès-Meknès 1,835 282,294.34 417,055.38
Laâyoune -Sakia El Hamra 1,293 160,520.76 12,924.59
Drâa-Tafilalet 999 129,176.58 93,139.82
Guelmim-Oued Noun 1,157 5,695.62 58,555.72
Dakhla -Oued Ed Dahab 298 3,488.02 3,349.90
TOTAL 15,730 9,559,249.32 6,449,841.47
Note: Financial capital and turnover for Moroccan cooperatives by regions for 2015, (ODCO, 2016)
132
ISSN 2029-4581   eISSN 2345-0037   Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies
 
FIGURE 1. Moroccan co-operatives evolution for the period 1994-2015
Note: The sample period is from 1994 to 2015. The figure shows the Moroccan co-operatives evolution 
(Annual total number of all sectors; ODCO 2016).
2. Conceptual game theory model and co-operatives’ static equilibrium
Within entrepreneurial capabilities and innovation in co-operatives (Daft, 1978), 
members face structural changes of the market in terms of the number of co-operatives. 
In this case, it is important to question both the static and dynamic equilibrium in terms 
of the number of co-operatives. Conceptualizing co-operatives equilibrium is lacking in 
theoretical research and scientific explorations. The theory presented in this paper aims 
to fill this gap and draw a conclusion about the economic behavior of co-operatives. 
Our theoretical analysis is based on different assertions about the objectives of co-op-
eratives, especially the economic implication of novo entrants.
In order to determine the theoretical foundations for co-operatives equilibrium, we 
specify some important assertions. The co-operatives market is characterized by a num-
ber of co-operatives whose members are not completely informed about the market-
demand function and market-entry-barriers (naive expectation of new entrepreneurs 
and bounded rationality) but who are, nevertheless, seeking to maximize their benefits 
(Green, 2002), through their production capacity, without considering other strategies. 
The significant demand affected by consumers’ preferences for the products of co-op-
eratives can lead sellers to intuitively affect the price. In this position, the co-operatives 
market can be much closer to an oligopoly, with exception of entry-and-exit barriers and 
the well-informed-agent assumptions of the oligopoly market. Co-operatives market is 
supposed to be in lack of these two assumptions. Otherwise, encouraging co-operative 
emergence can cause a market shift to a position that might be much closer to the one 
of perfect competition (a big number of co-operatives and a big number of consumers), 
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but with differences in terms of capabilities that are supposed to be weak in co-operatives 
market. The rationale behind this argument is that entrepreneurial skills are assumed to 
depend on the adaptive tensions of the cyclic shifting from a managed economy toward 
an entrepreneurial one, or what Kirchhoff (1994) calls dynamic capitalism. Second, 
members of co-operatives are adjusting their decisions from the perspective of their 
framing interest (Bijman et al., 2013) and feelings instead of economic rational (Boone 
& Ozcan, 2016).  Thus, organization complexity in co-operatives arises as a result of 
members bounded by rationality and heterogeneity (Simon, 1982; Chaddad & Ilio-
poulos, 2013; Dacin & Tracey 2011). The “Co-operatives -market” can be summarized 
by the following essential assumptions:
•	 Members seek for utilities or benefits
•	 Price taker: New entrants have no power over setting prices at prior time 
•	 No barriers to entry or exit: each producer does not take into account others’ strategies
•	 Naive expectations: agents who are not well-informed (bounded rationality) 
•	 Capacity-constraint assumption: supply is correlated to production capacity (mem-
bership)
•	 Homogeneous products: The products are perfect substitutes for each other, (i.e., the 
qualities and characteristics of  market goods or services do not vary between different 
suppliers).
We assume that co-operatives are characterized by a high degree of product homo-
geneity, whose members face similar cost functions, and demand conditions. Future 
interactions with competitive factors and market performance may be the result of an 
increase in entrepreneurial capabilities that enable co-operatives to face market forces 
and risks, and recognize entry barriers. In our model, our weight factor is the num-
ber of co-operatives. The other factors that are completely connected to the number of 
co-operatives are profits, the capacity constraint, and demand (this interaction between 
factors is important to determine the equilibrium points). The literature discusses oth-
er factors that affect co-operative supply, such as promotional effort (Yu-Chung Tsao, 
2015) and inventory control (Zhang et al., 2008). In our model we suppose that in 
Morocco, the novo entrants are weak in terms of adaptive learning for investing part 
of earnings to promote products and also to face risk. They are more concerned with 
membership principals and production capacity. Boone and Ozcan (2016) argued that 
de novo co-operatives prefer to operate for a higher volume of their supplies instead of 
diversification.  Supply is demonstrated to have a positive impact on total process in-
novation activity of co-operatives (Giannakas & Fulton , 2005); others argue that the 
evolution of co-operatives depends on members’ sense of identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 
2005), commitment, loyalty, and cohesion. For instance, Münkner (2012) argues that 
co-operatives are as good as their members make them, and for a member to become 
loyal, his life needs must be satisfied (Maslow, 1943). This idea, suggested by Münkner 
confirms that co-operatives must upgrade their production and sales processes while 
incurring costs, such as the effort required to stabilize revenue. For more details related 
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to co-operatives’ values and principles, see Birchall, (2011), Mazzarol and Mamouni 
(2011), Münkner (2012).
2.1. Model set up
We use the methodology of the Nash equilibrium to determine the equilibrium num-
ber of co-operatives and earnings. Many researchers have used this methodology for 
different types of markets, e.g.,  for the electricity market (Xuena et al., 2015). We start 
by building a model of co-operatives (labeled i = 1, 2…, n) that produce products that 
are supposed to be substitutable, and where players make their choices during discrete 
periods t = 0, 1, 2... Let Qi(t) represent the output of co-operative i during period t. 
The market price p(t) in period t is determined by total supply Q(t) = Q1(t)+ QW(t) 
through a demand function f(Q) = P(t). We consider a linear form for p (t).
   (1)
 denotes the rival co-operatives’ output.
Market demand, D, at time period t is expressed by the following linear demand 
curve.
 (2)
Demand is a linearly decreasing function of “a” and “β”, commonly considered by 
co-operatives theorists as the case of a downward-sloping demand. P(t) is the market 
price at time t; “a” and “β” are non-negative coefficients. β is a theoretical parameter that 
describes the magnitude of demand elasticity for co-operatives; a relatively small value 
of β indicates a relatively high demand elasticity. This parameter makes up the differ-
ence between the ordinary products of IOFs and co-operatives’ products and allows 
the co-operatives to increase supply.  
In the Moroccan context, the co-operative products may not be like industrial prod-
ucts. They are known to be driven from natural resources, and this may impact the pref-
erence of consumers for labeled products of co-operatives, especially the Novo entrants 
(de novo) co-operatives that are associated with a strong focused identity (Boone & Oz-
can, 2016); a representative example of this are the Moroccan Argan oil co-operatives 
that satisfy demand in national and international markets of traditional and natural lo-
cal products (Ibourk & Amaghouss, 2014; Montanari, 2019). 
Co-operatives’ products can cause demand to be prone to lower magnetic elasticity 
as compared to traditional products. This means the co-operatives are about to put into 
the market something that does not exist in novel Schumpeterian or novel entrepre-
neurship (Baumol 1968, 2002; Schumpeter, 1934). 
In the co-operative type of entrepreneurship, if the production capacity, the value of 
the products and the entrepreneurial capabilities, respectively, do not change during a 
period of time, then the rate of entry (number of co-operatives) and demand are plau-
sible factors that affect the market share.
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The situation in the co-operatives market will strongly depend on the beta parameter 
with the following theoretical forms:
•	 	ε > β > 1: Demand is not affected by possible increases in price. Rather, the demand, 
here, is due to preferences for co-operative products, in other words, to the value of 
preference β.
•	 β = 1: A further increase in the price starts to negatively affect demand.
•	 0	<	β	<1: A scenario of high elasticity that can induce a shift in the demand curve.
2.2. Co-operatives equilibrium
Based on our theoretical assumptions, if demand is strong enough to consume total 
supply, co-operatives will be constrained by their production capacity. For simplifica-
tion, we assume that co-operatives are operating under constant unit costs Ci, so Ci > 0. 
The demand function is formulated as follows:
,
0,  ε ,      
1   (3)
α is the parameter that describes the production capacity level. A small value of  induc-
es a large market share, and above a certain value ε' (high loss in production capacity), 
the co-operative exits. This parameter is describes loss in production capacity, which 
induces a stop in sales. We assume that production capacity K depends on parameter α 
with .  n' is the number of users (membership), and L is the co-operative 
productivity that depends on n' workers W and M other production factors. Productiv-
ity for the cooperatives is contingent on the productivity of its members (Grashuis & 
Su, 2019). 
The actual problem is for co-operatives to seek utility, subject to local constraints. 
Following the Nash equilibrium methodology, the first order condition for the opti-
mization problem gives the equilibrium points of outputs Q, price P, and benefit π, for 
co-operative 1.
Proposition 1. The problem has a unique Nash equilibrium. The proofs are provid-
ed in the appendix. 
   (4)
=    (5)
   (6)
(6) Shows the equilibrium point that makes the earnings of co-operative 1. The 
earnings depend especially on alpha parameter and the quantity produced by the other 
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co-operatives. When ε > β > 1, the co-operatives are likely beneficial to produce as 
much as their capacity constraint is small.
Proposition 2. We generalize the problem for N co-operatives. The proofs are pro-
vided in the appendix.
The results are shown in Table 1. The results suggest that co-operatives’ earnings 
depend essentially on the number of co-operatives, demand conditioned by β and a, 
and the capacity constraint α. In the case of strong demand—one that absorbs all of 
the new supply from the new entrant—the co-operatives market equilibrium can remain 
stable. But, with elastic or stable demand under the hypothesis of limited entrepreneur-
ial capabilities, the number of co-operatives that emerge will negatively affect supply 
and co-operatives’ revenues, thereby may cause co-operative destructions. Thus, when 
co-operatives are constrained by their number, the market-share constraint for co-op-
eratives’ substitutable product is as follows:
  (7)
Thus, we can write (7) in the following form: 
ߚܽ ൭෍ሺݔ௜ሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൱ ൌ ߚܽ    (8)
xi is the production of co-operative i; and 
From the formula for the equilibrium shown in Table 1, we obtain the following 
result, which characterizes the demand for co-operatives’ products in the equilibrium 
situation:
 + C  (9)
Substituting (9) into (8), we obtain:
(  + C  (10)
Proposition 3. Solving the problem of obtaining N, which ensures the flow of total 
outputs, we obtain 
𝑁𝑁∗ �  𝐶𝐶
��1 – ∑ �������� ��
4𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗�∑ �������� � 1��   (11)
The proofs are provided in the appendix.
In (11), with ෍ሺݔ௜ሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ͳ , there will be no free space for new entrants. The margin 
for new entrants is a dynamic gap that especially depends on demand and profits. High 
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boundaries in demand can free up space for new entrants seeking to benefit and allow 
for risk reduction and profits, which in turn helps to avoid co-operative destruction. 
Otherwise, moving (improving) the equilibrium point of profits reduces the gap for 
new entrants. The specific number of co-operatives will be primarily dependent on gen-
eral demand, which involves production capacity (Verheul et al., 2002), a population 
growth that is associated with potential consumers (Keeble & Walker, 1994; Reynolds 
et al., 1995; Armignton & Zoltan, 2002; Bosma et al., 2008), and a zero-profit equilib-
rium level of demand, as suggested by Schmalensee (1992) and Sutton (1991). This 
result suggests that co-operatives are in a number of basic scenarios. Improvements 
in entrepreneurial capabilities lend to visibility in entry barriers through users’ adap-
tive learning, since new entries will be conditioned by market opportunities (Mueller, 
1986). In this case, when there is always a well-informed agent who can make individ-
ual decisions on entering if opportunities exist, then co-operatives’ members become 
entrepreneurs who are entitled to both wages and profits. In this market cycle, public 
policies can finally be specified and clearly defined, with entrepreneurship at the core. 
In contrast, a lack of entrepreneurial skills negatively affects co-operatives’ performance 
(Press et al., 2008), and the market may be characterized by the invisibility of entry bar-
riers for co-operatives. In this latter case, the co-operative system might be character-
ized by the dynamics of their numbers, with the number of entries and exits being the 
dynamics. The number of co-operatives may impact earnings and account for the flow 
of co-operative destructions, which, in turn, causes new co-operative formations. From 
this point of view, we need to study the adjustment process of co-operatives in terms of 
their number, so as to understand whether the growth index is a mean-reversion or ran-
TABLE 1. Co-operatives Nash equilibrium
 
N 2 3 4 … N 
 
𝑸𝑸  
 
�� � �
4𝛼𝛼  
 
 
�� � �
6𝛼𝛼  
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8𝛼𝛼  
 
 
… 
 
�� � �
2𝑁𝑁𝛼𝛼  
 
 
𝑷𝑷  
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2  
 
�� � �
2  
 
�� � �
2  
 
… 
 
�� � �
2  
 
𝝅𝝅  
 
 
��� � ��
8𝛼𝛼
�
 
 
��� � ��
12𝛼𝛼
�
 
 
��� � ��
16𝛼𝛼
�
 
 
…  
 
��� � ��
4𝑁𝑁𝛼𝛼
�
 
 Note: The Nash equilibrium generalized for the homogeneous products of N co-operatives. The last line 
shows the generalized results, with the equilibrium point in terms of profit.
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dom-walk process. If the co-operatives growth index reverts to the mean (i.e., stationary 
process), the co-operative flow eventually returns the number to its equilibrium level. 
The next section will bring empirical investigations to the process of the co-operative 
growth index. 
3. Number of co-operatives and the adjustment process 
3.1. Data and methodology
The objective was to analyse co-operatives in terms of their number. The game theory 
was needed to determine the equilibrium points in terms of the number of co-operatives. 
This section establishes the dynamic equilibrium by analyzing the adjustment process 
of co-operatives growth. 
To have a clear idea about how the number of co-operatives influences the dynamic 
changes that take place in the equilibrium process, we study the dynamic equilibrium 
by analyzing whether the growth in the number of co-operatives is a random-walk or 
mean-reversion process. If the process is mean reverting, then we determine the speed 
of adjustment to the equilibrium. The model to capture the speed of adjustment in 
terms of the number of co-operatives (dynamic equilibrium) is based on time series 
data. 
The dataset consists of the semi-annual changes in the number of co-operatives, 
which we then convert to the growth index  ξ. The specificity of the growth index is 
related to co-operatives dynamics, while other studies use a ratio of “number of co-op-
eratives and total working population” in order to represent co-operatives growth 
(Díaz-Foncea & Marcuello, 2015), and the total number of entries and exits for spa-
tial analysis (Perotin, 2006). The method included in this paper uses a co-operatives 
growth index as one indicator in order to analyze the speed of adjustment and capture 
the complete picture on the growth and dynamics of co-operatives (creations - destruc-
tions cycles).  Thus, the growth index measure is likely a valuable indicator for policy 
makers who wish to stimulate co-op creation and ensure they do not meet a speedy 
demise. 
This is a composite index that includes agricultural, artisanal and fishery co-opera-
tives as follows: 
   (12)
where nt is the number of co-operatives in time t, and nt–1 is the number of co-operatives 
in time t–1. Our approach is to estimate the models that describe changes in the co-op-
eratives’ growth index that defines changes in the co-operatives number. This dynamic 
implies that the conditional mean and the variance of the changes in the co-operatives’ 
growth index depend on the level of ξt . 
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The data are obtained from the Moroccan Co-operative Development Office 
(ODCO). The sample period is from 1994 to 2015, and all of our tests are conduct-
ed using EVIEWS 7.0. Figure 2 below shows the growth-index dynamics for the agri-
cultural, artisanal, and fishery co-operatives for the period 1994 to 2015. While these 
are high importance sectors in terms of Moroccan socio-economics, the co-operatives 
included in this series have shown the importance of including the availability of com-
plete data over a long sample period, as this renders the results of our study more con-
vincing. Also, the co-operative sectors included in these series are in harmony with our 
theoretical model on co-operatives owning products and seeking revenue.
To empirically test the returns assumption, we test the null hypothesis of the 
mean-reversion stationary stochastic process. Testing for stationary is equivalent to 
testing for mean reversion (Brigo et al., 2008). 
The best and most popular tests for this hypothesis are the augmented Dickey and 
Fuller tests (1979, 1981, ADF) and the Phillips–Perron tests (1988, PP). These tests 
allow highlighting the nature of the processes of co-operatives as a random walk process 
or a mean-reverting process. The stationary assumption is a must allowing the use of 
models analyzing the speed of adjustment. 
 
  FIG. 2. Growth index dynamics 
Note: The period is from 1994 to 2015. The figure shows the co-operatives growth-index dynamics 
     for agricultural, artisanal, and fishery co-operatives. 
3.2. Summary statistics and mean reversion measurement 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics we calculated for the co-operatives growth index 
included in the study. A quick glance at the results reveals that agricultural co-operatives 
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had the highest growth index (8.22) over the period under review (1994 to 2015), with 
an average of 1.63 new co-operatives per year and a minimum growth index of about 20 
percent, while fishery co-operatives showed the lowest growth index (3.5000), with a 
minimum growth rate of about 14 percent. The same classification applies to standard 
deviations for co-operatives in these sectors. We can also find that the growth index in 
these three sectors is highly leptokurtic. The measures of skewness show that all of them 
are positively skewed. Furthermore, the results of the Jarque–Bera tests suggest that the 
growth index is non-normal for agricultural and artisanal co-operatives and normally 
distributed for fishery co-operatives.
Table 3 presents the results of the conventional univariate unit root tests (ADF 
and PP). We can see that this rejects the non-stationary hypothesis for the three sec-
tors. Therefore, we can conclude that the co-operatives growth index is a significantly 
mean-reverting (I (0) stationary) process for all sectors. The mean reversion appears 
in the constant intercept, in the scope of the trend function, and in both. The results 
lend support to the mean-reversion process. This means that shocks to the co-opera-
tives growth index are all temporary, and the growth index eventually returns to the 
trend path. Additionally, this indicates that the volatility of the growth-index changes 
with the boundaries over time. This means that the same shocks to the co-operatives 
growth index are repeated over time, which contributes to adjusting the ratio toward an 
equilibrium level. This assumption confirms a return to the long-term mean target level 
over time (the second scenario in Proposition 3). For the ordinary firms, excess profits 
attract competitors (in the absence of significant barriers to entry), causing a lowering 
of firms’ profits. This process persists until the profit rate returns to its competitive level, 
possibly causing firm destructions.
TABLE 2. Summary statistics
Min. Mean. Max. Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera
Agricultural 0.2079 1.6358 8.2272 1.8592 2.8363 9.7389 67.8932***(0.0000)
Artisanal 0.1800 1.5387 7.8148 1.5582 3.364314 13.9603 144.7283***(0.0000)
Fishery  0.1428 1.3401 3.500 0.8856 0.9513 3.1712 3.1935(0.2025) 
Note: The sample period is from 1994 to 2015.
*** Significance at the 1% level, P-value in parentheses
The existing literature on profit persistence generally follows the mean-reverting 
view of firms’ profits that is called “the competitive environment.” However, while 
co-operative firms are not in the competitive game (weak-capabilities assumption), 
the cause of mean reversion may be simultaneously co-operative members’ irrational 
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behavior in view of their lack of capabilities, and the government support for co-opera-
tives start-ups, and the associated risks of new entrants and market size. For policymak-
ers, mean-reversion is a cause for concern. This is because it enables forecasting future 
movements in the growth index that are based on past ones, since forecasting that is 
based on a mean-reverting process proves to be quite different from forecasting that is 
based on a random-walk process. This process is the “risk discounting effect” (Sarkar, 
2003) that can be specified and used by policy makers to reduce the systematic risk of 
entry-and-exit flow.
TABLE 3. Unit root test results (ADF and PP) for the co-operatives growth index
Sectors 
ADF tests PP tests
No trend With trend No trend With trend
Agricultural -5.959*** (0.0001)
-5.106*** 
(0.0030)
-13.863*** 
(0.0000)
-13.513*** 
(0.0000)
Artisanal -3.843*** (0.0093)
-20.397*** 
(0.0001)
-4.142*** 
(0.0049)
-4.245** 
(0.0164)
Fishery -7.196*** (0.0000)
-5.734*** 
(0.0016)
-5.569*** 
(0.0002)
-10.253*** 
(0.0000)
Notes: The table reports ADF and PP tests for the mean-reversion hypothesis for the co-operatives growth 
index. For the ADF, the lag length is optimally chosen using the sequential procedure suggested by Camp-
bell and Perron (1991), using the maximum lag length to eliminate serial correlation in the residuals. For 
the PP tests, the truncation lag is set to 12. ***Significance at the 1% level; **Significance at the 5% level; 
*Significance at the 10% level; with p-value in parentheses
3.3. Model behavior and speed of adjustment
The mean-reversion process for co-operative emergence is the result of a stochastic 
process. Recidivism exists because co-operative emergence is the flow of entries and 
exits. A change in the number of co-operatives is a process of mean reversion that con-
tinuously and immediately returns the number to its original static state when it hits a 
certain boundary. Co-operatives-growth-index oscillations can be modeled as a func-
tion of the mean-reversion Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) process. Then, we explore the 
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process in relation to the continuous time growth index process, 
as follows:
  (13)
where the long-term mean level and the speed of adjustment are λ and α , respective-
ly. dW is a standard Wiener process, and σ is the volatility, which reflects the different 
assumptions about the stochastic process under which the growth index evolves. The 
volatility that is correlated to the growth index is the continued change in the number 
of co-operatives, and the mean equilibrium level is a key characteristic of stable growth 
of the index ξt .
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It can be easily shown that when using Itô’s lemma (Shreve, 2004), the discrete 
model corresponds to the following form:
  (14)
  (15)
  (16)
The index’s expected level of future growth is a weighted average between the most 
recent value of index growth, ξt , and the mean-reversion level of index growth λ. The 
speed of adjustment is determined by the parameter α.
3.4. Calibration of the model
In our case, estimates that use the GMM method (Hansen, 1982) are most suitable 
when explaining the dynamics of index growth and the speed of adjustment. This meth-
od has a number of important advantages. First, it does not require that the distribution 
of the process change be normal; it requires only that it is stationary and ergodic, and 
that the relevant expectations exist. These requirements are consistent with our data 
and testing of the mean-reversion process. Second, the GMM estimators and the stand-
ard errors are consistent, even if the disturbances are conditionally heteroskedastic.
The process in Eq. (16) is intuitively an AR (1) process that can be described by the 
following equation (Brigo et al., 2008):
  (17)
Then, we transform the regression coefficients in Eq. 16 to derive the parameters of 
the model.
The adjustment dynamics are defined by the speed of adjustment α.
For b = (1 – αΔt) we have
where the speed of adjustment is equivalent to (1 – b) with constant increment Δt = 1, 
(Paula et al., 2016).
And from Eq. 6 we have c = α.Δt.λ
By substituting α into this equation we obtain
� � �� � �𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 � � 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥� � 
 � � � 𝑐𝑐� � �� 
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The guideline is to estimate the parameters in discrete time Eq. (17) and make a trans-
formation to obtain the speed of adjustment and the long-term mean equilibrium level.
3.5. Speed of adjustment
This study is based on the use of the co-operatives growth index to report the parameter 
estimates under Eq.16 and its equivalence under Eq.17. The parameters are estimat-
ed from the different simple-growth-index time series and the normalized-growth-in-
dex time series to allow for a comparative analysis across sectors. Table 4 reports the 
parameter estimates with the associated P-value. This estimate provides a number of 
interesting insights about the dynamics of the co-operatives growth index. First, the 
Wald test confirms a rejection of the null hypothesis that the parameters are equal to 0, 
significantly for all sectors (P	<	0.001).	Second,	our	findings	on	the	speed	of	adjustment	
provide important insights. We find that the growth index of agricultural co-operatives 
is adjusted at a speed of 59%, with a half-life of 1.169 years. This implies that, for co-op-
eratives in this sector, it takes approximately 1.17 years to remove half of the shock 
effect on the growth index; in other words, the 59% speed of adjustment suggests that 
every year, on average, the growth index gets roughly 59% closer to the mean target 
level. For the artisanal co-operatives, the growth index is adjusted at a speed of 61%, 
with a half-life of 1.132 years. This suggests that every year, on average, the growth index 
gets roughly 61% closer to the mean target level. Finally, for fishery co-operatives, the 
growth index is adjusted at a speed of 52%, with a half-life of 1.321 years. This suggests 
that every year, on average, the growth index gets roughly 52% closer to the mean target 
level. A comparison between sectors confirms that the artisanal co-operatives growth 
index rapidly reverts to its mean target level. This means that co-operative creations 
(destructions) are rapidly followed by co-operative destructions (formations). This im-
plies that shocks to the artisanal co-operatives growth index have a high effect in com-
parison to other sectors. Put another way, the artisanal market is more fragile.
TABLE 4. Estimation results for the speed of adjustment
Agricultural Artisanal Fishery  
Simple ξ
b -0.169** (0.0000
-0.132*** 
(0.0000)
-0.321*** 
(0.0036)
c 1.236*** (0.0000)
1.263*** 
(0.0000)
1.683*** 
(0.0000)
Mean. Level β 1.057 1.115 1.270 
Adj. Speed α 1.169 (59%)
1.132 
(61%)
1.321 
(52%)
Wald test 
Null hypothesis: 
b = c = 0
147.893*** 143.695*** 296.087***
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Agricultural Artisanal Fishery  
Normalized ξ
b -0.169*** (0.0000)
-0.133*** 
(0.0000)
-0.321*** 
(0.0036)
c 0.123*** (0.0000)
0.139*** 
(0.0000)
0.445*** 
(0.0000)
Mean. Level β 0.105 0.122 0.336
Adj. Speed α 1.169 (59%)
1.133 
(61%)
1.321 
(52%)
Wald test 
Null hypothesis: 
b = c = 0
116.067*** 104.858*** 237.872***
Note: Estimation for the sample period 1994-2015, applied for the co-operatives’ sample ξ and normal-
ized-growth-index . We estimated the results for agricultural, artisanal, and fishery co-opera-
tives. The parameters are estimated for discrete time under Eq.19 and its equivalence under Eq.20, using the 
Generalized Method of Moments, with the t-statistic given in parentheses. ***Significance at the 1% level; 
**Significance at the 5% level
Conclusion, implications, and outlook
Our theoretical model and results claim the importance of exploring the co-operative 
flow for several reasons. In particular, it is important to understand the trend adjust-
ment process of the co-operatives cycle in order to preserve co-operatives equilibrium 
and prevent their fast death. We suggest structural policies that reduce the fragility of 
the market by targeting a low speed of adjustment in the growth index (stabilization). 
We place particular emphasis on the need to do so for artisanal co-operatives.
Scale constraints are likely to be related to the invisibility of entry barriers that may 
lead to continuing entries and closures, thereby risking the possibility of returns being 
under a mean-reversion process. Our results call into question the impact of policies 
that seek to increase new co-operatives formations. Moroccan policy was to stimulate 
starts; there is a risk of volatile entry-and-exit behavior that affects the equilibrium 
points. Co-operatives suggest that output is the first objective. This may differ from 
those of IOFs, both in the short and long run, especially if the demand curve is down-
ward sloping. The results of this paper suggest that an additional set of instruments may 
also be valuable in generating the co-operatives growth index and policies that focus on 
allowing the industry structure to adjust in the right direction. For example, the gov-
ernment policy targeting co-operatives’ total number leads to individuals with limited 
human capital being encouraged to start co-operatives. The co-operatives market is not 
yet well established (Stenholm et al., 2013), and members of co-operatives are unlikely 
to develop businesses in the absence of help from other policies.
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The government should think more about offering an enabling environment through 
adaptive tensions as “push factors” that help the economy convergence from a managed 
one to an entrepreneurial one and help co-operatives develop their business plans and 
capabilities. When adaptive tensions are constructed, the government may focus on the 
short-term policy that encourages co-operative formations. In contrast, we recommend 
that policy makers be more specific in their analyses of market factors (competition, 
demand, profitability) by giving more weight to long-term policies for social welfare. 
Some scholars have suggested solving this problem for small businesses by controlling 
the industry sector (Kim, 2006).
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Appendices
Proposition1. The problem has a unique Nash equilibrium
Proof 
We have 𝑄𝑄� � 𝑄𝑄� � ������  and for all P we have 𝑃𝑃 � �� � �𝑄𝑄� � �𝑄𝑄� and the gain of co-operative 1 is defined by�𝜋𝜋 � �𝑄𝑄��𝑃𝑃 � ��. Substituting P in the equation of 𝜋𝜋 gives  
𝜋𝜋 � �𝑄𝑄��� � �𝑄𝑄�� � �𝑄𝑄�𝑄𝑄� � �  
Then, the first order condition to optimize the problem for 𝑄𝑄� is  
��
��� � �� � ��𝑄𝑄� � �𝑄𝑄� � � And the optimum can be reached when 
��
��� � �  
This gives the equilibrium point 𝑄𝑄 ������������   
To obtain the equilibrium point for P, we substitute 𝑄𝑄� in 𝑃𝑃 � �� � �𝑄𝑄� � �𝑄𝑄� . Hence  
𝑃𝑃 � �� � ������������ � � �𝑄𝑄� . Then 𝑃𝑃 �
��������
�   
For the profit, we substitute 𝑄𝑄 and 𝑃𝑃 in 𝜋𝜋 � �𝑄𝑄��𝑃𝑃 � ��. We obtain  
𝜋𝜋 � ����������� �
��������
� � ��.  And we solve to obtain  𝜋𝜋 �
�����������
��   
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Proposition 2. Generalizing the problem for N co-operatives
Proof 
In the case of two co-ops in a local area, demand is defined as  
Co-operative 1 is constrained by its production capacity, which is limited by the maximum 
demand and the co-operative’s neighbor, which is considered to have a similar cost function 
and, in most general cases, the same opportunities. We suppose that when co-operative 1 is at 
the maximum capacity of production, then demand will be equitably shared with its co-opera-
tive neighbor. In most general cases, co-operatives operate at the same level of production and 
cost function that ensure that they share demand. But the new entrant may be constrained by a 
high lack of production capacity, that is, one that is approximately equal to . 
For simplicity and in order to generalize the problem, we suppose that demand is shared 
equitably depending on the production capacity. With the same method above of optimizing 
the problem in Proposition 1, we solve for co-operative 1, and have the following:
𝑃𝑃 � �� � 𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄� � 𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄� And 𝜋𝜋 � �𝑄𝑄��� � �𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄�� � 𝑄𝑄�𝑐𝑐  
For ����� � � we obtain �� � �𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄� � 𝑐𝑐�= 0, then 𝑄𝑄 � �
����
��   
 
Substituting 𝑄𝑄 in P to obtain 𝑃𝑃 � ������ , and substituting 𝑄𝑄 and 𝑃𝑃 in 𝜋𝜋 to obtain  
𝜋𝜋 � ��� � ��8𝛼𝛼
�
 
 
For N = 3 we have 𝑄𝑄� � 𝑄𝑄� ��𝑄𝑄� � � �����  Hence  
𝑃𝑃 � �� � 𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄� � 𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄� � �𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄�.  And  𝜋𝜋 � �𝑄𝑄��� � �𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄�� � 𝑄𝑄�𝑐𝑐  
For  ����� � �� we obtain  
𝑄𝑄 � ������� ,   𝑃𝑃 �
�����
��    and   𝜋𝜋 �
������
���
� 
 
Following the same method, to generalize N co-operative, we have 
 
𝑄𝑄� � 𝑄𝑄� ��𝑄𝑄� � �𝑄𝑄� � � �����  . Hence  
𝑃𝑃 � �� � 𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄� � 𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄� � �𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄� ���𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄�  And 𝜋𝜋 � �𝑄𝑄��� � �𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄�� � 𝑄𝑄�𝑐𝑐  
For ����� � ��we obtain  
𝑄𝑄 � �������� ,   𝑃𝑃 �
�����
��   and  𝜋𝜋 �
������
���
� 
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Proposition 3. N which ensures the flow of total outputs.
Proof Proof.  
The first equation is 
 
(√4𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁��∑ 𝑥𝑥����� � � ��� �∑ 𝑥𝑥����� � � √4𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + C  
Factoring with  (√4Nα𝑁𝑁�  we obtain ��√4𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁��∑ 𝑥𝑥����� � ��� � ��� � ∑ 𝑥𝑥����� )  
Hence  
√4Nα𝑁𝑁 � � ����∑ ������ ��∑ ������ ����  . And  4𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 � ��
����∑ ������ �
�∑ ������ ����
�
�
 
 
And solving for N, we obtain  𝑁𝑁 �� �������∑ �������� �
�
���∗�∑ �������� ����
 
 
